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The present Equity Research serves the purpose of performing a valuation of Farfetch, the 
leading technology platform for the global luxury fashion industry.  
The valuation was performed considering the company’s bulls – it belongs to an expanding 
market; it follows the market trends; it disrupts the market – and its 
bears – it might not sustain high take rates in the future; the possible 
negative effect of its mergers and acquisitions strategy; Brexit. 
After analysing the company and the market, a Discounted Cash Flow model was built. Our 
final recommendation is a Buy, with a price target of $16.98. 
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We are initiating coverage of Farfetch with a Buy 
recommendation and a $16.98 price estimation. In our view, the 
company is a buy for several reasons:  
(1) The luxury personal goods market growth (5% 
Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) until 2025) and the 
shifting to online (25% of the overall market in 2025). Currently, 
Farfetch’s market share represents 1% of the overall market, 
existing plenty of space to grow;  
(2) Emerging markets. China, the market chosen by Farfetch to 
make two great investments – JD.com and CuriosityChina - is 
predicted to represent 45% of the industry’s revenue in 2025; 
(3) Highest take rate when compared to its competitors (30% 
VS 9.7% Competitors’ average); 
(4) 10x more Stock Keeping Units than its closest competitor 
(Yoox Net A Porter); 
(5) Strong Partnership Relationship. 98% of its partners 
entered in an exclusive contract and it was able to retain 100% 
of its top brands; 
(6) New Guards Group and Stadium Goods acquisitions. We 
believe these will drive the number of active consumers growth 
(~30% CAGR until 2025), increasing the Marketplace Gross 
Merchandise Value (54.7% of growth from 2018 to 2019). 
Valuation/Risks - Our target price is based on a DCF model 
explained in the valuation section. Company bears are related to 
the take rate pressure, M&A strategy’s risk and Brexit. 
Company description 
Farfetch Ltd. is the leading luxury digital marketplace. It connects 
shoppers from 190 countries with 1,022 brands and designers. 
Apart from the marketplace, it provides its sellers white-label e-
Commerce services through Black & White Solutions – 
empowering its online presence. 
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(in $ thousand and %) FY2017 FY2018 2019E 
Revenues 386,016 603,299 1,074,334 
Operating Costs (299,260) (471,766) (708,944) 
EBITA (90,846) (165,978) (265,221) 
NOLLAT (88,637) (94,363) (173,366) 
GMV  909,763 1,407,699 2,318,448 
Growth  54.7% 64.7% 
Net Profit Margin  -24% -28% -31% 
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Farfetch Limited, the first Portuguese unicorn, describes itself as the leading 
technology platform for the global luxury fashion industry. It offers luxury brands 
and retailers from all over the world a high-reach marketplace and solutions to 
improve its online presence. 
The company follows the market and keeps investing to take advantage of it. It is 
battling with the industry giants knowing that luxury fashion is being driven by the 
online presence of highly regarded brands, by acquiring companies on the high-
growing Chinese consumption market, on the active and streetwear market 
segments, and by nurturing relationships with its partners.  
Despite its losses that mostly come from the strong investment in demand 
generation, the company has been performing well for the past years. It is both 
highly liquid and solvent, has low leverage, has minimum inventory risk and its 
revenue has been constantly growing at rates above 50% in the previous years. 
Farfetch does not have direct competitors due to its unique business model. 
However, it has several companies with whom competes indirectly (other online 
luxury fashion retailers). 
The firm has four main sources of revenue: Platform Services Revenue 
(Marketplace), mainly driven by Active Consumers, Number of Orders per 
Consumer, Average Order Value and Take Rate; Platform Fulfilment Revenue 
(Black & White Solutions); Brand Platform Services Revenue (New Guard’s 
Marketplace) and In-Store Revenue (Browns, New Guards, and Stadium Goods). 
To perform a valuation of the company, we built a DCF model. Through it, we got 
to a share price of $16.98. Our final recommendation is a buy. 
Glossary 
• Active Consumers – a consumer that has made a purchase on the Marketplace within the 
last 12-month period; 
• Average Order Value – the average value of all orders placed on the Marketplace excluding 
value-added taxes; 
• Brands – brands with whom the company has direct relationships; 
• Farfetch Black & White – comprehensive modular white-label business to business e-
commerce solution for brands and retailers; 
• First-party sales – sales on the marketplace of inventory directly purchased by Browns 
store; 
• Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) – the total dollar value of orders processed; 
• Number of Orders – total number of consumer orders placed on the Marketplace, gross of 
returns and net of cancellations, in a particular period; 
• Digital Platform Fulfilment Revenue – revenue from shipping and customs clearing services 
that the firm provides its consumers, net of consumer promotional incentives; 
• Platform Order Contribution – gross profit after deducting demand generation expense, 
which includes fees that the company pays for marketing channels; 
• Retailers – boutiques and department stores with whom the firm has a direct contractual 
relationship to display and sell the products in the marketplace.  
Company Overview 
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Luxury Market Opportunities & Shifting to Online 
Overall, the luxury market grew 5% in 2018 with personal luxury goods being the 
most representative segment in the industry – reaching $290.51 billion in sales. 
Shoes and jewellery were the core products, representing 7% of the total personal 
luxury goods sales.  Also, casual and streetwear categories experienced a jump in 
2017 because of the increasing importance of younger buyers and workplace 
casualization. 
Along with these trends, the market is accelerating its transition to online - the 
online luxury shopping represented 10% of all luxury sales in 2018 which is 
equivalent to a 22% growth ($27 billion of sales). In the forecasted years, the luxury 
market is expected to continue growing at an annual rate of 3% to 5% and the 
online channel to represent 25% of the market’s value.1  
We believe that both luxury and e-commerce market growths are going to enhance 
Farfetch’s ability to attract and retain consumers contributing to an active 
consumers CAGR of 35.8% until 2025. Also, Farfetch has a market share of $3.1 
billion which represents approximately 1% of the overall personal goods luxury 
market – there is enough space to grow in the market. 
Emerging Markets – The Chinese Market Luxury Consumption 
The demand for luxury fashion is global. In previous years, America and Europe 
accounted for almost two-thirds of sales in the global personal luxury goods 
market. Over the next decade, emerging markets like China, the Middle East, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe are expected to drive the luxury goods market, with 
Chinese consumers representing 46% of the market in 2025.1 
To secure this growth opportunity, Farfetch expanded its business in China by 
entering in a partnership with JD.com, one of the two massive online retailers in 
China, and with the CuriosityChina’s acquisition, supporting our view that China 
will detain a higher stake of the company’s revenue in the future (graph 1). 
Farfetch Strategies to increase its Market Share 
Farfetch is working to become a winner in the luxury fashion online market. On 
one hand, it is currently the leading technology platform and has no direct 
competitors due to its business model. The company operates without inventory 
risk, contrarily to similar luxury online retailers like Yoox Net a Porter2, having 
 
 
1 All this data was collected from Claudia D'Arpizio, Federica Levato, Filippo Prete, Elisa Del Fabbro, and Joelle de Montegolf ier, LUXURY GOODS WORLDWIDE MARKET STUDY, FALL–WINTER (BAIN, 2018).  
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335,000 Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) on its marketplace in 2018 (ten times more 
than its closest competitor). On the other hand, the company keeps following the 
market trends by adding new sections to its platform like jewellery and watches, 
and by speaking to its millennial customer base with the acquisition of Stadium 
Goods and New Guards Group – these are brands of the future that sell streetwear 
and activewear. 
These growth drivers together reflect our view for the future Platform GMV – 37.8% 
CAGR until 2025. 
Strong Partnership Relationship 
As of December 31, 2018, Farfetch had 1,022 luxury sellers on its marketplace, of 
which 640 were retailers and 382 were brands that sell directly on the platform 
(graph 2). 
Due to the company’s effort to build a strong connection with its partners, 98% of 
the retailers entered an exclusive relationship with the company. Additionally, in 
the last three years, Farfetch has retained all its top 100 retailers. 
Recently, Prada picked Farfetch as the only online retailer holding the rights of the 
exclusive distribution of Linea Rossa, popular in the 1990s and early 2000s for its 
aesthetics. It entered as well into a partnership with Chanel through Farfetch Black 
& White Solutions. 
These facts boost our belief that the company is leveraging up its relationship with 
some of the most well-known brands and it has been able to keep its existing luxury 
partners loyalty – a competitive advantage that is aligned with the predicted 
revenue growth. 
Data and Market Insights  
One of the advantages of working with Farfetch is that the company provides its 
partners with rich consumer data sets and algorithms that can lead to operational 
efficiencies. This process generates critical insights that allow boutiques/brands to 
operate following their clients’ needs in terms of the most relevant products, pricing 
strategies and inventory management. Also, Farfetch buying experts provide 
tailored perspectives on industry trends and new season launches. 
Farfetch Store of the Future 
Farfetch wants to build the Farfetch Store of the Future, one of the most important 
moves of the company. It is a modular platform that enables the design of 
technological solutions to humanize the retail experience, delivering 
personalization to customers and empowering store staff. This will enhance what 
Farfetch is doing with luxury fashion – revolutionizing how people buy luxury goods 
and disrupting traditional offline markets. 
0 200 400 600 800
Brand Partner
Boutique Network
Number of Partners in 2018 and 2019E 
2018 2019E
Graph 2 - Number of Partners in 2018 and 2019 
(third quarter) 
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Farfetch is currently charging high prices to brands and retailers due to not having 
any direct competitors so far and also due to the high proposition value it offers 
(beyond being an intermediary, it offers services) – its take rate has been rounding 
30% over the years, a high value considering its similar companies and the overall 
marketplace business. 
However, the future is uncertain and direct competition might come up, forcing the 
company to charge lower prices and losing competitive advantage. 
M&A Strategy 
As previously mentioned, one of the company’s strategies to increase its market 
share is to follow market trends. One way to achieve this is with the acquisition of 
brands that fit in that vision. 
The company has acquired three businesses in the last fiscal year (2019) for 
almost $1 billion in total. Although these can be smart acquisitions, they can also 
prove to be bad investments – it is proved that more than once acquirers overpay 
for the companies due to an overestimation of the synergies that come with the 
merger of the two companies. 
In addition, investors are starting to turn its back on the company (when the 
company announced New Guards Group acquisition, the share price fell by almost 
40%). For a company that has not yet shown to be profitable, spending so much 
money to grow inorganically can result in a market’s bad reaction.  
Brexit 
By being a marketplace, Farfetch’s sales won’t probably be that affected, since the 
company operates all over the world - the only thing that is on the British territory 
is, in fact, its headquarters. 
However, the company’s CEO claimed that Brexit can impact talent acquisition. 
Being a company that has embarked on the path of technology disruption, not 














Farfetch Limited, founded in June 2007 by the Portuguese entrepreneur José 
Neves, is a global luxury digital marketplace that sells luxury fashion goods like 
women, men and kids wear, accessories and bags from various boutiques and 
brands around the world (graph 3). The company believes it is reinventing how 
consumers discover and engage with luxury fashion, so it keeps investing in its 
platform developments to deliver the highest-quality experience. In December 
2018, there were approximately 1.3 million active consumers from 190 different 
countries. Farfetch’s shares are traded in the New York Stock Exchange since 
2018 when the company became public with a share price of $27.  
Apart from the primary application – the Marketplace Platform - the company offers 
other services (graph 4) - Black & White Solutions, Seller Tools and Farfetch Store 
of the Future. Farfetch Black and White Solutions was created to help other 
businesses developing and expanding their online presence, inventory 
management, and global logistics. Seller Tools aims to provide Farfetch’s partners 
(retailers and brands) operational efficiencies – end-to-end management of the 
online selling experience and an integration platform built to deliver a retail solution. 
Lastly, Farfetch Store of the Future reflects the company’s vision – to disrupt the 
luxury industry with a platform that will connect both the online and offline retail 
worlds. 
Moreover, Farfetch acquired Browns (physical store) in 2015, to obtain insights 
and a better understanding of the luxury fashion market.  
We estimate that Farfetch will reach $1 billion in revenue in 2019, which will grow 
at a 43.5% CAGR until 2025. 
Business Model  
Farfetch started its activity by empowering the online presence of designers 
without any e-Commerce, to currently be working with some of the most well-
known brands such as Gucci, Alexander McQueen, and Burberry. 
In its marketplace, the company generates third-party revenue through 
commissions derived from negotiations with other retailers, first-party revenue that 
results from luxury goods directly purchased by Browns and then sold online, and 
fulfilment revenue - includes the provision of shipping services, packaging 
materials, and credit card processing. Apart of the marketplace, the company 
generates revenue through services rendered to its sellers, including Farfetch 
Black and White Solutions; through physical stores – Browns, Stadium Goods and 
New Guards Group; and lastly, Brand Platform Revenue (New Guards Operations 
less of in-store revenue, Farfetch marketplace and other authorized e-commerce 





Revenue per Segment as of December 2018
Fulfilment Revenue
Platform Services Revenue (1P+3P+
B&W and others)
Browns In-Store Revenue
Graph 3 - Revenue per Geography as of 
December 2018 
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websites) (figure 1). 
Unlike typical retailers, Farfetch differentiates itself because it has no physical 
inventory, which allowed the company to grow faster, due to not having inventory 
risk. 
The Marketplace 
Figure 2 illustrates how the marketplace works.  
Starting with the production step, content is created (sellers send the sample of 
the products for photography) and then exposed in the marketplace. Farfetch 
generates demand with its marketing strategies. When customers place the order 
and proceed to the payment, the seller receives the order, prepares it for delivery 
in Farfetch packaging and in 3 to 4 days, the client receives it. Lastly, Farfetch 
follows up the order to provide, if necessary, customer service and uses Farfetch 
Access to evaluate customer satisfaction. 
Performance Analysis 
Operating Performance 
Both Farfetch’s revenues and GMV have been growing around 50-60% in homolog 
terms in the past years (graph 5), making it a high-growth company. However, it 
hasn’t shown yet to be profitable – its Loss after Tax has been growing at a higher 
pace than its Sales. This is evident by the comparison between Gross Margins of 
around 50% and negative Net Profit Margins of 20-50% - explained by the 
company’s investments in terms of Demand Generation Expense and Technology 
Expense. The company spends in these categories from one-quarter to one-third 
of its revenue generated in a year. This is concerning investors – Condé Nast, the 
parent of Vogue, GQ and Vanity Fair, has dropped its stake in the company (6% 
 
Figure 2 - Farfetch Marketplace Model 
 
Graph 5 - GMV, Revenue and Loss After Tax 
 








of the Farfetch’s equity) (Peixoto 2019). However, the company believes it is going 
to achieve breakeven by 2021, through some cost efficiencies (Fernandez 2019) - 
it was stated that it was its goal to decrease the Demand Generation Expenses in 
percentage of Adjusted Revenues, and it has. However, we don’t agree with 2021 
to be the breakeven point (our estimated breakeven year is 2025). In terms of 
returns, the Annual Economic Profit in percentage of Revenues3 in the last three 
disclosed years has been always around negative 30% - the company is investing 
more than it is gaining from it. We expect that those investments returns will realize 
in the period between 2019 and 2021. 
Activity Efficiency 
The company has a negative Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) (table 1) when it 
comes to its store that has improved from 2017 (-67 days) to 2018 (-35 days). This 
negative ratio comes from the fact that the company receives from the consumer 
in the moment of the sale but pays the suppliers on average 117 days after it 
receives the inventory, never holding it for more than two months. 
However, when it comes to the main business – the marketplace - the inventory 
goes straight from the brand/retailer to the consumer – the brand/retailer has the 
Farfetch containers in which it puts the product(s) sold and ships directly to the 
consumer. 
Capital Structure and Liquidity 
Farfetch’s capital structure consists mainly of equity, debt in form of capital leases 
(from 2019 on, due to the IFRS 16) and excess of cash. The company doesn’t 
usually issue regular forms of debt (bonds, loans, etc.) and, when it does, it repays 
the full amount in about one year – it happened from 2016 to 2017. This is related 
to the fact that the company is a high-tech company – most of its assets are 
intangible, which means that the company does not have collateral to provide to 
lenders. However, the company’s net debt is negative and very high – it detains a 
lot excess of cash, causing the Debt-to-Equity ratio to be negative and around 
100%. This high value of Excess of Cash is reflected on the liquidity ratios of the 
company (table 2) – from 2016 to 2018, the company went from a Cash Ratio of 
168% to a ratio of 216% , meaning that if the company had to pay its current 
liabilities right now, it would have the capacity to pay it twice. The Working Capital 
Ratio is also high, as can be seen in table 2. Additionally to be highly liquid, it is 
also highly solvent – the firm has a sustainable capital structure to finance its 
activity (table 3). Finally, the company is independent towards its creditors – the 
Financial Autonomy Ratio was twice what banks consider to be healthy in 2016 
 
 
3 We chose this ratio to measure the company’s return based on the article Dodd, M. and Rehm, W. (2005). Comparing performance when invested capital is low. [online] McKinsey & Company. Available at: 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/comparing-performance-when-invested-capital-is-low. 
FY2017 FY2018
Days Sales of Inventory 65 67
Days Sales Outstanding 0 0
Days Payables Outstanding 131 102
Cash Conversion Cycle -67 -35
Leverage FY2016 FY2017 FY2018
Gearing Ratio -3.2 0.0 0.0
D/E Ratio -105.3% -94.8% -91.5%
Solvency Ratio 94.3% 238.9% 257.5%
Fin. Auton. Ratio 48.5% 70.5% 72.0%
Liquidity FY2016 FY2017 FY2018
Current Ratio 202.3% 290.5% 302.9%
Cash Ratio 167.8% 246.3% 216.0%
Table 1 - Cash Conversion Cycle 
Table 2 - Solvency 
Table 3 - Liquidity 
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and almost third times it in 2017 and 2018 (table 3). 
Mergers & Acquisitions 
Acquisitions can be a powerful tool to accelerate revenue growth. This strategy is 
vital when we refer to software or online services platforms, extremely dependent 
on the growth rate. 
Farfetch seeks to acquire and invest in other companies or technologies to 
complement or even expand its brand and products. It is possible to observe the 
company’s acquisitions during the past years in table 4. 
    Table 4 - M&A Activity 
 
For the forecasted years, we have considered the most recent acquisitions - 
Stadium Goods and New Guards Group - because the synergies created with both 
acquisitions are not reflected yet on Farfetch’s annual financial statements. 
Possible Future Outcomes 
Stadium Goods 
Stadium Goods is the world’s premier sneaker and streetwear marketplace. This 
company, which will continue independent as part of the deal, sells deadstock 
products (rare and limited-edition sneakers and streetwear) online and in a brick-
and-mortar store in New York. 
In terms of market share, this acquisition will help Farfetch to expand to one of the 
major fashion markets – sneakers ecosystem – and to access the second-hand 
market which is attracting more and more sneaker fanatics and collectors. 
Also, this acquisition is predicted to impact the company’s revenue through 
increasing the number of active consumers and the Average Order Value (AOV) 
growth (graph 6) - from the 4th quarter of 2018 to the 1st quarter of 2019, AOV grew 
approximately 23%. 
New Guards Group 
New Guards Group (NGG) is an Italian contemporary luxury fashion production 
and distribution holding company, founded in Milan. It owns brands like Off-White 
and Supreme which dominate the mainstream fashion (streetwear brands). The 
company believes that this acquisition will complement the Stadium Goods’ one. 
(US $ thousands)
Company Year M&A type % Acquired Deal Value %Cash %Equity
% of Contingent 
Consideration
Browns Limited 2015 Acquisition 100% 31,781 28,5% 38,1% 33,5%
iMall Holdings Limited 2015 Acquisition 100% 4,609 2,47% 79,0% 18,5%
Laso Co Limited 2015 Acquisition 100% 3,544 100%
Fashion Concierge UK Limited 2017 Acquisition 100% 2,183 100%
Style.com 2017 Acquisition 100% 12,411 100%
JD.com 2017 Merge
Curiosity China 2018 Acquisition 100% cash&equity 
Stadium Goods 2019 Acquisition 100% 250,000 cash&equity 
Top Life 2019 Acquisition 100% 50,000 100%



















Active Consumers (thousands) Average Order Value
Graph 6 - Stadium Goods impact on the Number of 
Active Consumers and the Average Order Value 
 








Farfetch is expecting to attract millennials due to NGG alternative and sportive 
fashion design and to generate higher revenue directly through the new layer – 
“Brand Platform” – with an expected GMV of $156,678 million by the end of 2019. 
After analysing how the company operates, how it has been performing and what 
it is doing in terms of M&A, it is necessary to understand the market, the main 
trends and the competitive landscape. 
The Market  
Luxury Fashion Market Overview 
The Luxury Fashion Market is characterized by products which price, quality and 
aesthetics differ from “normal” brands. According to the definition, luxury brands 
price offerings belong to the most expensive products of their category, that have 
higher quality and unusual designs. 
Fashion is highly impulsive and volatile due to the rapidly changing nature of its 
trends. Therefore, brands and retailers must constantly be one step forward in 
relation to its consumers - adapting the supply to the demand. 
The global personal luxury goods market grew 6% at constant exchange rates, 
outperforming the overall market with $260 billion of value in 2018 (graph 7). It is 
expected to grow 3-5% per year from 2019 until 2025.1 
To forecast the company’s revenue, we have considered the luxury fashion market 
revenue per the main geographies in which the company operates - America, 
EMEA and Asia Pacific. As it can be seen in graph 8, EMEA detains the highest 
revenue stake when compared to America, and Asia Pacific. However, it is 
expected that in 2022, Asia Pacific luxury fashion revenue growth will overtake 
America’s. The overall CAGR of these geographies is predicted to be 2.4% until 
2025.4 
What is driving the market growth? 
Emerging Markets 
Europe, the current market share leader, holds approximately 32% of the market. 
However, emerging markets like Asia and Japan have been increasing its share 
over the years, with a CAGR of 10% from 2010 to 2018 in comparison to Europe 
or Americas, 4% and 5% respectively (graph 9). Also, it is expected that in 2025 
China represents 46% of the personal luxury goods sales and that it will continue 
to be a market growth driver (its share is predicted to grow from 8% to 22% only 
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Graph 7 - Value of the Personal Luxury Goods 
Market Worldwide (in $ thousand) 
Graph 8 - Luxury Fashion Market Revenue per 
Geography (in $ million) 
Graph 9 - Share of The Personal Luxury Goods 
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Online Luxury Market 
Although there is some consumer reluctancy on buying luxury goods online - most 
of the luxury consumers prefer to live the experience and personalized service in-
store - due to technological improvements and the emerging of online platforms 
(Farfetch, YNAP, Amazon, etc), luxury brands are becoming more comfortable 
with the shifting to online (graph 10). By 2025, the online channel is expected to 
represent 25% of the market’s value. 
The New Era of Millennials 
Millennials, also known as Generation Y, one of the largest generations in history 
(92 million compared to 77 million baby boomers (U.S.)) were born in a time of 
technological change, globalization and economic disruption. Together with 
Generation Z, they represented 47% of the luxury consumers and 33% of the 
overall luxury purchases in 2018 (graph 11).1 
These generations have been changing luxury fashion due to their differentiated 
preferences comparing with previous generations – they are logo-driven (brand 
loyalty) and prefer streetwear and activewear instead of traditional styles. Also, 
millennials are more willing to go through the online platforms even though the in-
store experience is still preferred. 
In 2025, both Generations Z and Y are expected to represent 55% of the luxury 
market which makes undeniable the importance of younger consumers in the 
luxury fashion market – strongly connected to technology, highly educated and 
with purchasing power. 
Farfetch customer average age is 36 and almost 70% of its clients are younger 
than 40. This may be one of the reasons why Farfetch is investing in companies 
like Stadium Goods and New Guards – to catch those market moves. Also, the 
company believes that over 50% of its consumers are Millennials. 
Market Trends  
Trends are what ultimately drive the Luxury Fashion Market. Therefore, it is 
expected that companies will make significant investments in stimulating the 
interest of younger population segments.5 
Accessories remained the largest personal luxury goods category, with a CAGR of 
9% from 2010 to 2018 (graph 12). As mentioned before, shoes and jewellery were 
the fastest-growing products in the accessories segment and both represent 7% 
 
 
5 Patrizia Arienti, Global Powers of Luxury Goods (Deloitte,2019). 
Graph 10 - Global Online Personal Luxury Goods 
Market (in billion) 
Graph 11 - Share of Global Personal Goods Luxury 
Consumers by Generation 
Graph 12 - Personal Luxury Goods Market Value 
Worldwide from 2009 to 2018, per Segment (in 
billion) 
 








of the total personal luxury goods. 
Competitive Landscape 
Competitors 
The luxury fashion retail industry is highly competitive, being characterized by its 
concentration, differentiation, product mix, and cost structure. 
Farfetch is a high-tech luxury fashion marketplace that acts more like a technology 
company than as a typical retailer - one of the reasons why it differentiates itself 
from the others. 
On one hand, Farfetch is competing with offline channels such as LVMH - the 
leading luxury fashion company, which detains the highest stake in the luxury 
market sales. On the other hand, it is competing with more direct competitors - 
online luxury retailers, such as Yoox Net a Porter, MyTheresa, Matches Fashion 
and 24 sèvres. We analysed all the companies mentioned above, once there are 
some operational and business similarities between those companies and Farfetch 
in terms of the target audience, cost structure and upcoming strategies (table 5). 
 
    Table 5 - Competitors Analysis 
LVMH is a French multinational luxury goods conglomerate, headquartered in 
Paris.  Its business plan aims to tightly control the brands it manages to maintain 
the luxury perception related to its products – as an example, Louis Vuitton is only 
sold through its boutiques or online platform. In 2010 LVMH launched the online 
store 24 sèvres that sells more than 150 brands, 20 of which are group owned. It 
 
(2018) Farfetch YNAP MyTheresa Matches Fashion 24sèvres 
Founded Date 2007  2015 2006 2007  2017 
Sales (in billion) $0.603 $2.1 $0.336 $0.293 $0.21 
AOV $619 $328 $600 $727 - 




Multibrand online Retailer Online retailer 
Phy sical Stores Yes No No Yes No 
Of f icial Brand No No No Yes (Raey) No 
Brands/Designers >1000  >1000  >250 >400  >150  
Mobile App Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Value Chain Retailers handle 
f ulf ilment. Farfetch 





entire v alue 
chain – f rom 
product 
inv entory, to 
f ulf ilment 
- Controls the entire value 
chain – it has inv entory 
management software and 
local warehouse teams. 
Third party  logistics firms 
transport the products to 
the end costumers 
- 
Geographic Reach Worldwide Europe and 
US 
Worldwide Worldwide Worldwide 
except China 
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is the only multi-brand online retailer selling Dior, Celine and Louis Vuitton. 
Farfetch and Yoox Net a Porter, a pure e-commerce retailer that controls the entire 
value chain, which concept is to sell overstocked or unsold items at discounted 
outlet prices, are currently the most established companies (graph 13) in the luxury 
fashion online market. In that sense, YNAP is Farfetch’s biggest competitor. 
By comparing Farfetch with the competitors previously identified, we concluded 
that two of the main competitive advantages are: 
1. Farfetch has no inventory which means that it can focus all its efforts on the 
platform, product, service, and technology; 
2. Farfetch has 10 times more Stock Keeping Units (SKU’s) than its biggest 
competitor, YNAP (graph 14). This achievement was a consequence of the 
aggregation supply from many global sources, offering consumers both breadth 
and depth of luxury merchandise. 
Analysing the competitive landscape in terms of differentiation, it is possible to 
highlight the following: 
- YNAP launched a print magazine called Porter; 
- 24 sèvres is the only online retailer selling Louis Vuitton and its app includes 
a video chat feature which allows users to talk with a stylist based in Paris; 
- Matches Fashion has its own brand, one of Farfetch’s goals – to build the 
Farfetch brand; 
- The founder of Net-a-Porter joined Farfetch team and will help the company 
to enhance its consumers’ engagement. 
Comparables 
We chose the companies Grubhub, Just Eat, Square and Shopify as Farfetch’s 
comparables. The first two companies are online marketplaces that have a similar 
growth profile to Farfetch. The last two companies are technology enablement 
companies that Farfetch defined as comparables.6 The comparison between 
companies can be found in table 6. 
 
 
6 Both Square and Shopify are mentioned in the company’s form F-1 – Registration Statement as competitors. We chose them as comparables because we consider both companies to be indirect competition (not a 
luxury fashion marketplace). 
Graph 13 - Farfetch and its Competitors Sales in 
2018 (in billion) 
Graph 14 - Farfetch's SKU 
 








       Table 6 - Farfetch's Comparables 
 
Followed by the company’s position in the market, we will now understand where 
the company is expected to be in the forecasted years. 
Financial Outlook 
Revenue Drivers 
As it was explained before, Farfetch generates revenue through four sources: the 
Marketplace (which includes Fulfilment Revenue, First-Party (1P) Platform 
Revenue, and Third-Party (3P) Platform revenue); Black & White Solutions and 
other services; physical stores and now, with the New Guards’ acquisition, Brand 
Platform (figure 3). 
 
  Figure 3 - Farfetch's Revenue Drivers 
Marketplace GMV [Fulfilment GMV + 1P Platform GMV + 3P Platform GMV]                                                                                                                                                                                                                
The company generates the Marketplace Gross Transaction Value (GTV) through 
transactions between sellers and consumers (equation 1). The GTV net of returns 
results on the Gross Merchandise Value (GMV), the total dollar value of orders 
processed that the company collects and remits to sellers after deducting its 
income (equation 2). We estimated the Marketplace GMV by forecasting the 
number of Active Consumers (AC), the Number of Orders, the Average Order 
Value (AOV) and the Returns – which are the Marketplace Drivers. 
Farfetch - FTCH (NYSE) Grubhub - GRUB (NYSE) Just Eat - JE. (LSE) Square - SQ (NYSE) Shopify - SHOP (NYSE)
Founded 2007 1999 2001 2009 2004
Headquarters London, the United Kingdom Chicago, Illinois London, the United Kingdom San Francisco, California Ottawa, Canada
Internet and Direct Marketing Internet and Direct Marketing Internet and Direct Marketing Data Processing and Internet Services and 
Retail Retail Retail Outsourced Services Infrastructure
Online Marketplace Online and Mobile Platform Hybrid Marketplace Payment and Point-of-sale Cloud-based Multi-channel 
Business Model for Luxury Goods for Restaurant Pick-up and  for Online Food Delivery  Solutions Provider Commerce Platform
  Delivery Orders
Number of employees 3232 2722 4772 3349 4000
Geographic reach Worldwide USA and UK Worldwide US and internationally Worlwide
2018 Sales (in $ million) 602.4 1,007.3 993.5 3,298.2 1,073.2
Sales CAGR 2019E - 2021E (%) 52.1% 17.6% 26.2% 3.6% 37.9%
Market Cap (in $ million) (1) 3,094.5 4,486.5 7,171.2 27,413.7 47,284.0
Total EV (in $ million) (1) 2,938.9 4,672.7 7,265.8 27,308.7 44,727.9
D/E ratio (%) (2) 7.1% 40.8% 29.5% 85.2% 3.9%
Take-Rate (%) 32.00% 14.00% 18.00% 2.75% NA
(1) As of 27/12/2019
(2) As of 30/09/2019, except for Just Eat, where the last available data is dated 30/06/2019
Industry
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𝐺𝑇𝑉 = 𝐴𝐶 𝑥 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝐴𝑂𝑉 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑀𝑉 = 𝐺𝑇𝑉 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
Before going through the forecast, there are two main assumptions to consider: 
1. When estimating the GTV, we forecasted the weight of each geography on 
the total revenue until 2025, considering the past weight and the increasing 
importance of China in the luxury personal goods market (6% CAGR in terms of 
Chinese consumers market share)7 (graph 15). Consecutively, we assumed that 
the number of active consumers and number of orders per geography would be 
calculated based on that weight. 
2. As a high-growing company, Farfetch is expected to grow faster than the 
market. Therefore, to analyse both the impact of the market and of the company’s 
internal strategies on Farfetch’s ability to generate results, we have analysed 
Farfetch’s comparable firms – Shopify, Square, GrubHub and Just Eat (graph 16). 
We were then able to conclude that in those high-growth companies, 33.77% of its 
growth was explained by the market and the other 66.23% by the company itself.  
3. Fulfilment GMV = Fulfilment Revenue and 1P Platform GMV = 1P Platform 
Revenue because Farfetch acts as the principal in these transactions. The same 
doesn’t apply to 3P Platform Revenue, which is commission based on a third-party 
take rate.  
Active Consumers 
Consumers are deemed to be active if they purchased on Farfetch Marketplace 
within the last 12-month period. We considered that the number of active 
consumers (AC) depends on the number of Existing Consumers (EC) (the ones 
the company retains) and the New Consumers (NC) (the ones the company 
attracts) (equation 3): 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝐶 = # 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐶 + # 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐶 
Farfetch disclosed the weight of existing consumers on the total GMV from 2015 
to 2017. With this, we assumed that the number of existing consumers in those 
years was equal to equation 4, that then allowed us to evaluate the company’s 
retention rate (equation 5): 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐶(𝑡) = % 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐶 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑀𝑉(𝑡)  × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝐶 (𝑡)  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐶 (𝑡)
# 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝐶 (𝑡 − 1)
 
In the previous years, the retention rate varied approximately between 76% and 
 
 






Graph 15 - Percentage of Each Geography on The 
Total Revenue 
Graph 16 - Comparables Growth as a % of the 
Market Growth 
 








83%. For the forecast years, it is expected to desaccelerate reaching 72% in 2025 
due to the increase in the number of AC. Therefore, the number of EC will grow 
from 1,801 thousand in 2019 to 6,249 thousand in 2025 (a CAGR of 34.7%).  
Regarding the NC, its generation is influenced by both the luxury and e-commerce 
market growths (33.7% external impact) and by the company’s Demand 
Generation Expenses (DGE) (66.3% internal impact) (equations 6 and 7): 
 % 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐶 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝐺𝐸 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐶 (𝑡)−# 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐶 (𝑡−1)
𝐷𝐺𝐸 (𝑡)
 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐶 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐷𝐺𝐸 = % 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝐶 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝐺𝐸 (𝑡)  × 𝐷𝐺𝐸 (𝑡)  
For the forecast years, the number of NC is expected to grow at a CAGR of 
approximately 37.1%, reaching 5,268 thousand in 2025. Both the forecasted EC 
and NC can be seen in graph 17. 
Combining both rationales, we concluded that the total number of AC in 2025 is 
expected to be 11,517 thousand (graph 18) which reflects the company’s 
consolidation in the market, consumer loyalty and the value added by its 
acquisitions (Stadium Goods and New Guards Group). 
Lastly, the number of AC by geography goes in accordance with what was 
previously said – although Europe is expected to continue being the market leader 
in terms of sales, China is expected to overweight America. 
Number of Orders per Consumer 
The number of orders per consumer has been growing between 4.0% and 7.1%. 
For the forecast years, we are estimating it to grow at a slower rate reaching 3.2 
orders per consumer in 2025 compared with 2.2 in 2018. 
Average Order Value 
Luxury brands are exercising their pricing power linked to fierce customer loyalty 
(CPI,2018). While for the most traditional goods like Louis Vuitton prices went up 
less than inflation, for the trendiest ones the opposite happens, due to the market’s 
demand. That is why it is so hard to predict the AOV as it depends on each 
brand/designers’ product mix and pricing strategies and on Farfetch’s ability to 
influence its consumers to add more items per basket. 
Therefore, we assumed that the best approach to forecast the AOV was 
considering 2.1% Consumer Price Index CAGR until 2025 for luxury fashion and 




8 Statista based on International Monetary Fund 
(6) 
(7) 
Graph 17 - Forecasted Number of EC and NC 
Graph 18 - Forecasted Number of Active Consumers 
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Farfetch has a free return policy that attracts consumers. According to Narvar’s 
report, luxury shoppers (51.0% of them) are buying multiple versions of an item, 
trying at home and returning the products that don’t fit well – bracketing effect. This 
fact along with the increased number of active consumers led us to conclude that 
the rate of returns will increase in the forecast years. 
To conclude, the Marketplace GMV is predicted to grow at an annual compounded 
rate of 45.5% until 2025, which was expected considering the market trends and 
what the company is doing to cover those trends (graph 20).  
1P Platform Revenue 
From 2017 to 2018, 1P Platform revenue grew 181.2% and it is expected grow 
80.5% from 2018 to 2019. Since this revenue segment derives from the 
Marketplace GMV, in the forecast years it is expected to grow as a percentage of 
it. Also, because this is not the company’s core activity (it would rescind the entire 
point of the marketplace model), this growth rate is expected to deaccelerate. In 
2025, 1P Platform Revenue is predicted to be $322,613 thousand compared to 
$111,368 thousand in 2018. 
3P Platform GMV  
3P Platform GMV represents the highest stake in the company’s revenue. For the 
forecast years, we expect it to continue increasing. As it is possible to see in graph 
21, it is what drives 3P Platform Revenue, as it depends on both 3P Platform GMV 
and Other Platform GMV. 
Other Platform Including Black & White Solutions GMV 
The Other Platform GMV grew 106% from 2017 to 2018. In the forecasted years it 
is expected to remain a small part of Farfetch’s overall business, growing at a 
CAGR of 28.2% - Black & White Solutions GMV equal to $230,960 thousand in 
2025.  
Third-Party Take Rate 
In the past years, the company’s take rate varied between 30% and 32% 
respectively, but due to high competition, we are expecting this rate to decrease to 
29.3% until 2025. Brands and especially small boutiques can start rejecting 
Farfetch high take rates if it affects their ability to make profitable sales.  
Graph 20 - Marketplace Forecasted GMV 
Graph 21 - 3P Platform Revenue 
 









In-Store Revenue results from in-store sales at the two Browns boutiques in 
London, Stadium Goods and New Guards Group in-store sales. 
In 2017 and 2018, it represented approximately 1% (graph 22) of the total Group’s 
GMV. For the forecasted years, we are expecting its stake to remain a small part 
of the overall business, increasing at a CAGR of 15.5% until 2025. In 2019, In-
Store Revenue is expected to be $18,989 thousand, representing a 21.76% growth 
compared to the previous year. 
Brand Platform Revenue 
New Guards Group (NGG) is a brand platform that detains several luxury brands. 
With this acquisition, Farfetch added a new layer to its business model, Brand 
Platform Revenue that provides design, production and brand development 
capabilities. 
On the company’s 2019 third-quarter results, the two months revenue associated 
with the Brand Platform was approximately $62,000 thousand. Farfetch is 
expecting a revenue between $80,000 and $90,000 thousand in the fourth quarter. 
With this, we are predicting a final year’s revenue equal to $147,671 thousand. As 
there is no additional information regarding the future of this caption, for the 
forecast years we considered that it will grow as a percentage of the 3P Platform 
Revenue since Brand Platform Revenue is related with sales to boutiques which 
sells in-store or online (figure 4). In 2025, Brand Platform Revenue is expected to 
be $529,993 thousand (23.7% CAGR).  
After showing the rationale used to calculate the company’s revenue, it is now 
possible to conclude that in 2019, it is expected to be $1,074,334 thousand and 
that the annual compounded growth rate will be approximately 44% from 2019 to 
2025 (graph 23).  
Valuation 
DCF Model 
After traveling through the journey that is Farfetch, we’ve reached the destination: 
its valuation.  
It made sense for us to divide Farfetch’s valuation into three time horizons, due to 
the different phases we expect the company to go through in terms of growth 
profile: 2019E – 2025E; 2026E – 2041E and 2042E – Perpetuity. The time horizon 
segmentation was based on the company’s comparables plus Amazon, a high-
tech company that allowed to look a little bit further into the future. The first time 
horizon is the current one – high annual growth rates, ranging from 55% to 80%. 
Graph 22 - % of Each Service on the Group's GMV 
Figure 4 - Brand Platform Revenue 
Graph 23 - Company's Total Revenue 
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We defined it to end on 2025 because, by then, the company will have 18 years, 
average age at which the comparables’ growth rate starts to decrease (tables 7 
and 8). The second time horizon is characterized by annual growth rates of about 
30%. We set it to last from 2026 to 2041 based on our judgement – the oldest 
comparable, Amazon, has only “lived” for 25 years bu is still growing at 30% rates 
that aren’t predicted to decrease yet.  The last time horizon is the one until 
perpetuity, with an annual growth rate of around 4% (the same as inflation). The 
growth rates’ rationale will be explained below.  
Cost of Capital 
We derived the company’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) (equation 
8) to serve as the model’s cost of capital/discount rate. To estimate it, we computed 







∗ 𝑟𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝐶) 
 
Cost of equity 
We started by getting the company’s cost of equity through the CAPM formula 
(equation 9). As Market-Risk Premium (MRP), we used 5.75% suggested by the 
literature.9 As risk-free rate (rf) we used the US 10-year Government Bond rate – 
1.692%10 - once it is denominated in the same currency as our cash flows and it is 
perceived as a risk-free asset. 




The beta estimation comprised two steps: first, we estimated the beta performing 
a regression of Farfetch’s available weekly returns and the S&P 500 Index (used 
as a proxy for the market returns). Secondly, we estimated our comparables’ betas. 
In our estimation, we got a levered beta of 1.91, which may be inflated by 
abnormalities shown by a beta interval confidence of ]0.78;3.03[, and visible in 
graph 24. On the comparables’ estimation, the beta equalled 1.24, which seems 
too low for a luxury/high tech company’s stock. Therefore, the best approach was 
to compute the median between the two, resulting in a beta estimation of 1.58. The 
levered cost of equity equalled 10.8% using the CAPM formula (table 9). 
 
 
9 KPMG. (2019). Equity Market Risk Premium - Research Summary (30 September 2019). KPMG. 
10 Extracted from Bloomberg on 30/10/2019 
E(r)=Expected return of the company’s stock 
rf=Risk-free rate 
β=beta of the company’s equity 
MRP=Market Risk Premium 
E=Equity       re=Cost of Equity         V=Enterprise Value      
D=Debt         rd=Cost of Debt           Tc=Corporate Tax Rate 
Company's Age
15 16 17 18 19 20
Grubhub 85.12% 42.52% 36.35% 38.46% 47.46% 28.69%
Just Eat 27.04% 59.18% 34.55% 13.28%






















(1) Age at which its growth
rate started to slow down
Risk-free rate (rf) 1.69%
Levered Beta (βe) 1.58
Unlevered Beta (βu) 1.49
Market Risk Premium 5.75%
Levered Cost of Equity (re) 10.75%
Unlevered Cost of Equity (ru) 10.26%
Table 7 - Comparables’ Revenue Growth Analysis 
Table 8 - Age at which the comparables’ revenue 
growth started to slow down 
Graph 24 - Company Returns VS 
Market Returns 
Table 9 - Cost of Equity 
 








Cost of debt 
The cost of debt was estimated for each time horizon as a weighted average of the 
costs of the forms of debt we believe the company is going to sustain in the future. 
The capital leases and regular debt’s costs of debt were calculated based on 
equation 10. 
𝑟𝑑 = 𝑌𝑇𝑀 − 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 
 
Applicable to the whole company, the current Probability of Default11 (PD) of the 
company equals 0.36% and the Loss Given Default12 (LGD) 56.50%. The current 
company’s credit rating is BB-11. 
For the Capital Leases, the YTM was calculated as a weighted average of the 
comparables’ capital leases costs (4.73%) which resulted in a Cost of Capital 
Leases of 4.52% (table 10). For the regular debt, the YTM was based on an 
external source13, considering the company’s credit rating (5.45%) – led to a Cost 
of Regular Debt of 5.25% (table 10). The Costs of Debt for each period are 
presented in table 11.  
D/E Ratio 
As a result of our calculations, the 2019E D/E ratio was equal to 6.49%, value we 
assumed for 2019E – 2025E. The 2042E – Perpetuity D/E ratio was based on the 
average of the most ancient comparables’ current D/E ratios (Just Eat (29.5%) and 
Grubhub (40.8%)) – 35.15%.The 2026E – 2041E D/E ratio is the average between 
both D/E ratios – 20.82% - because we believe the company’s transition to debt 
will be done progressively. 
The Corporate Tax Rate used to calculate the WACC meets the assumption made 
in the model. 
A summary of the WACCs is presented in the left (table 12).  
Growth Rate 
The 2026E – 2041E Growth Rate was computed through equation 11.  
𝑔 = 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝑅 
 
ROIC was computed as 2025E ROIC plus an average of the absolute variation 
between ROICs from 2021E to 2025E because we believe most of the company’s 
 
 
11 Thomson Reuters 
12 Exhibit 20 - Ou, S., Irfan, S., Liu, Y., Jiang, J., & Kanthan, K. (2018). Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920 - 2017. Moody's Investors Service. 
13 Exhibit 11.13 - Koller, T., Goedhart, M., & Wessels, D. (. (2010). Valuation (University Edition) - Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
g=growth rate 
ROIC=Return on Invested Capital 
RR=Reinvestment Rate 
         rd=Cost of Debt                          YTM=Yield-to-Maturity 




Yield to Maturity (YTM) 4.73%
Probabillity of Default (PD) 0.36%
Loss Given Default 56.50%
Cost of Capital Leases 4.52%
Credit Rating BB-
Yield to Maturity (YTM) 5.45%
Probabillity of Default (PD) 0.36%
Loss Given Default 56.50%




Capital Leases 100.00% 57.64% 15.38%
Regular Debt 0.00% 42.36% 84.62%
Cost of Debt 4.52% 4.83% 5.14%
2019
2019E - 2026E - 2042E -
2025E 2041E Perpetuity
D/E 6.49% 20.82% 35.15%
re 10.75% 10.75% 10.75%
E/V 93.90% 82.77% 73.99%
rd 4.52% 4.83% 5.14%
D/V 6.10% 17.23% 26.01%
Tc 19.00% 16.00% 16.00%
WACC 10.32% 9.60% 9.08%
Table 10 - Cost of Capital Leases and 
Cost of Regular Debt 
Table 11 - Costs of Debt 
Table 12 - WACC for the three-time horizons 
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returns on investments will be realized on this period but, after a certain number of 
years, it will stabilize again around the same numbers it has shown before. The 
Reinvestment Rate (RR) was assumed the same as 2025E’s (96%), since we 
expect that, whenever the company turns profitable, it will reinvest its earnings on 
itself. We are confident in this assumption since a company only starts to pay 
dividends to its shareholders when it is stable enough to do so, and tech 
companies’ stability is difficult to predict. Also, we looked at the comparables’ 
dividend policy and no comparable has paid dividends since it was born, and when 
it did, it stopped a few years after (Grubhub). Lastly, for the 2026E – 2041E period 
the Growth Rate equalled 27%. 
For the last time horizon, we assumed the 2042E – Perpetuity Growth Rate to be 
equal to the average inflation rate14 – 3.34% - since we are expecting the industry 
to mature and only grow with inflation. 
Outcome 
Our Discounted Cash-Flow model assigns an intrinsic value to Farfetch’s stock of 
$16.98. For more detail, see below Table 13. 
    Table 13 - DCF Model 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
After completing the model, we performed two sensitivity analysis. Regarding the 
first analysis, we tried to understand the impact of the WACC and the growth rate 
used to calculate the Terminal Value on the company’s share price. As it is possible 
to see in table 14, Farfetch’s share price is extremely sensitive to slight incremental 
oscillations of both variables – fact that we observed when building the model. This 
 
 
14 Fund, I. M. (2019, October). Inflation rate, average consumer prices. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD 
 
Table 14 - Sensitivity Analysis 1 
 








sensitivity comes from the fact that most of the value of the company relies on the 
terminal value, which is calculated using both the WACC and growth rate. A small 
change in one of these variables escalates to a great variation of the Terminal 
Value. In the second analysis, we wanted to evaluate if the share price would be 
affected by the D/E ratios previously defined for the Annuity and the Perpetuity 
periods (table 15). It was possible to conclude that contrarily to the WACC and 
Growth Rate, when the D/E ratios vary, the share price doesn’t oscillate that much. 
    Table 15 - Sensitivity Analysis 2 
 
Scenario Analysis 
There were four important factors that we felt that needed further discussion after 
building the model due to its high importance to the company – Take Rate, Brexit, 
Farfetch Store of the Future and M&A. Therefore, we performed a scenario 
analysis for each one of them to quantify what would the impact of each one of 
these factors be on our valuation, ceteris paribus. Two of the factors – Take Rate 
and Brexit will be subject to a deeper discussion in our individual reports, annexed 
to this report. 
Take Rate 
As already mentioned, Farfetch’s current third-party take rate rounds 30%, one of 
the highest take rates charged by marketplaces.15 But this value can be threatened 
in a close future. To perform the scenario analysis, the factor influenced was the 
take rate. In the Downward (Upward) scenario, the take rate would progressively 
decrease (increase). We got to an Expected Value per Share of $13.80, as it can 
be seen in table 16 – if the company doesn’t make the effort of maintaining its take 
rate at the current values, the result can be disastrous. Further discussion about 
this topic can be read in the complementary analysis How do Take Rates Impact 
on the Online Marketplaces – A Case of Farfetch. 
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   Table 16 - Take Rate Scenario Analysis 
 
Brexit 
There is an important issue to be considered – talent acquisition. As a high-tech 
company, Farfetch strongly depends on its human capital that contributes to the 
marketplace development. What if Farfetch loses its talent? A more detailed 
discussion of this topic will be performed in the complementary analysis Should 
Farfetch make an (Br)Exit?. From the analysis, we can conclude that Farfetch’s 
expect share price doesn’t differ that much from the one derived from the model – 
Brexit is not expected to hit Farfetch hard.  
    Table 17 - Brexit Scenario Analysis 
 
Farfetch Store of the Future 
As already discussed, Farfetch’s goal was, is and will be to disrupt the market, and 
Farfetch Store of the Future is just one example. However, this is a difficult topic 
to quantify – the company hasn’t disclosed anything about this special project. This 
analysis is just an attempt to try to qualify this. However, there is no real information 
behind it, only our perception of what is a possible outcome of this project.  
The influenced factor in this analysis is the 2026E – 2041E Average ROIC. In both 
upward and downward scenarios, we don’t expect the overall ROIC of the 
company’s operations to oscillate much – that’s why we only increased/decreased 
this factor on about 10%. This is a high value because we expect this to represent 
a big stake in the operations of the company in the future. 
The base probability is the highest one because we believe it is the most likely one. 
The downward probability is also quite high because it is likely that this project 
 








doesn’t turn out what the company (and we) are expecting. 
Based on this, the expected value per share is $14.91, not that far from our 
valuation.  
    Table 18 - Farfetch Store of the Future Scenario Analysis 
 
M&A 
We performed an analysis on one of the company’s main strategy – inorganic 
growth. We influenced the forecasted revenues that come from the recently 
acquired companies – Brand Platform Revenue, descendant of the New Guards 
Group, and In-Store Revenue descendant of New Guards Group and Stadium 
Goods. We based this whole analysis on the McKinsey article “Where mergers go 
wrong”. Acquisitions can go wrong because companies overestimate the synergies 
created by the merger. In this case, we considered that the synergies would be a 
revenue variation. The percentages were defined as the lower and upper bounds 
of the realized synergies. The probability was the number of companies in the 
study that experienced the upper/lower bound as a percentage of the total studied 
companies.  
   Table 19 - M&A Scenario Analysis 
 
As it is possible to see in Table 19, we got to an Expected Value per Share of $-
45.78. From this, we can conclude that this is a strategy the company shouldn’t 
probably be following – the downward outcome is catastrophic and possible. 
However, this is under the assumption that the only synergies created are a 
variation of revenues. This makes this analysis very limitative. 
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In order to have another reference to what value Farfetch’s share price should 
take, we additionally performed a Multiple Valuation. 
We considered a multiple that comes from the company – EV/GMV. We also 
considered another multiple – EV / Revenue – that are based on the values of the 
comparables selected by us, already analysed by us – Just Eat, Grubhub, Square 
and Shopify. These are the ones that better represent the operating performance 
of the company.  
The “past”, “current” and “forward” multiples are based on FY2018, 2019E and 
2020E, respectively. EV / GMV is based solely on the company’s disclosed values 
and on our forecast. EV / Revenue is calculated based on the comparables’ value 
extracted from Capital IQ. 
The summary of the valuation is presented in tables 20 and 21. 
Football Field 
As it can be observed in graph 25, we get a range of share prices from $5.18 to 
$890.61 that comes from both the DCF and the Multiples. 
 
    Graph 25 - Football Field 
We consider that the results that come from the DCF model are the most accurate 
ones since the valuation process is the most complete. Our recommendation is a 




Table 20 - Enterprise Value based on multiples ($ 
billion) 
Table 21 - Price per Share based on multiples ($) 
 




























Reformulated Income Statement Forecasted Income Statement  
(in $ thousands, except share and per share data) FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Core Income
Operating Revenue 242,116 385,966 602,384 1,010,104 1,542,807 2,121,858 2,954,327 4,098,590 5,486,673 7,555,314
Cost of Revenue (125,238) (181,200) (303,934) (566,872) (834,970) (1,105,917) (1,480,714) (1,972,249) (2,530,464) (3,333,418)
% of Revenues -52% -47% -50% -56% -54% -52% -50% -48% -46% -44%
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (SG&A) (205,558) (299,260) (471,766) (708,944) (1,323,437) (1,635,000) (2,020,764) (2,554,857) (3,077,771) (3,813,073)
Depreciation (2,451) (3,648) (7,338) (9,491) (15,136) (14,513) (21,537) (32,384) (45,986) (55,462)
% of PPE (n-1) -23% -27% -25% -24% -23% -22% -21% -20% -19%
Amortization (4,446) (7,332) (16,199) (14,052) (291,695) (277,021) (223,988) (182,610) (159,680) (152,944)
% of IA (n-1) -17% -22% -21% -20% -19% -18% -17% -16% -15%
Demand Generation Expense (48,381) (69,202) (97,295) (134,509) (238,106) (285,035) (367,319) (427,617) (517,573) (561,607)
% of Adjusted Revenue -25% -22% -19% -16% -15% -13% -12% -10% -9% -7%
Technology (12,269) (31,611) (68,224) (82,850) (102,269) (140,653) (166,292) (271,685) (308,831) (425,270)
% of Revenues -5% -8% -11% -8% -7% -7% -6% -7% -6% -6%
Share Based Payments (19,848) (21,486) (53,819) (151,516) (151,715) (238,837) (355,403) (493,057) (619,302) (804,702)
% of Revenues -8% -6% -9% -15% -10% -11% -12% -12% -11% -11%
General and Administrative (118,163) (165,981) (228,891) (316,527) (524,516) (678,942) (886,225) (1,147,504) (1,426,399) (1,813,088)
% of Revenues -49% -43% -38% -36% -34% -32% -30% -28% -26% -24%
Depreciation 2,451 3,648 7,338 9,491 15,136 14,513 21,537 32,384 45,986 55,462
EBITA (86,229) (90,846) (165,978) (256,221) (600,464) (604,546) (525,614) (396,132) (75,576) 464,284
 Share of Profits of Associates 18 31 33 774 1,667 2,333 3,586 5,274 7,741 11,310
% of Investment in Associates 78% 53% 38% 46% 46% 43% 45% 45% 44% 45%
Depreciation (2,451) (3,648) (7,338) (9,491) (15,136) (14,513) (21,537) (32,384) (45,986) (55,462)
 Operating (loss)/gain (LBT/EBT) (88,662) (94,463) (173,283) (264,938) (613,932) (616,726) (543,566) (423,242) (113,821) 420,132
Operating cash taxes 17,732 18,184 32,924 50,338 104,368 104,843 92,406 67,719 18,211 (67,221)
Tax adjustments (17,708) (18,084) (33,007) (54,952) (110,490) (120,155) (99,218) (90,668) (32,080) 48,341
(NOLLAT) / NOPLAT (88,637) (94,363) (173,366) (269,552) (620,054) (632,038) (550,377) (446,191) (127,690) 401,252
Non-Core Income
Other interest income 278 323 4,401 8,802 15,844 25,350 35,490 46,137 57,671 69,205
Growth Rate 16% 1263% 100% 80% 60% 40% 30% 25% 20%
 Other interest expense (29) (1) (537) - - - - - - -
Result before taxes 249 322 3,864 8,802 15,844 25,350 35,490 46,137 57,671 69,205
Non-Operating cash taxes (50) (62) (734) (1,672) (2,693) (4,309) (6,033) (7,382) (9,227) (11,073)
Tax adjustments (272) (27) (37) (32) (35) (33) (34) (34) (34) (34)
Non-core result (73) 233 3,093 7,130 13,150 21,040 29,456 38,755 48,443 58,132
Financing
Deposit account interest 1,359 2,510 6,859 18,662 6,493 10,352 11,528 10,136 6,467 2,105
% of Cash and Cash Equivalents (n-1) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Interest on borrowings (1,473) (1,572) - - - - - - - -
Warrants issued (376) - - - - - - - - -
Result before taxes (490) 938 6,859 18,662 6,493 10,352 11,528 10,136 6,467 2,105
Adjusted taxes 98 (181) (1,303) 3,546 1,104 1,760 1,960 1,622 1,035 337
 
Financing result (392) 757 5,556 22,208 7,597 12,112 13,488 11,758 7,502 2,442
Comprehensive result (89,102) (93,373) (164,718) (240,215) (599,307) (598,885) (507,433) (395,678) (71,745) 461,826
Exchange differences on translation of foreign operations (27,322) 33,504 (24,142) (5,987) 1,125 (9,668) (4,843) (4,462) (6,324) (5,210)
Gains on cash hedges - - 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436
Unrealised exchange gains 7,643 - 9,143 5,595 4,913 6,550 5,686 5,716 5,984 5,796
Unrealised exchange losses - (18,902) - (18,902) (18,902) (18,902) (18,902) (18,902) (18,902) (18,902)
Other comprehensive (loss)/income (19,679) 14,602 (14,563) (18,857) (12,428) (21,583) (17,623) (17,212) (18,806) (17,880)
Total comprehensive loss for the year (108,781) (78,771) (179,281) (259,072) (611,736) (620,469) (525,056) (412,890) (90,551) 443,946
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Cash Flow Statement 
 
 
Reformulated Balance Sheet Forecasted Balance Sheet  
for the year ended December 31, for the year ended December 31,  
(in $ thousands) FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Total funds invested: Uses
Operating Cash 4,842 7,719 12,048 20,202 30,856 42,437 59,087 81,972 109,733 151,106
% of Revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Trade and Other Receivables 17,281 18,180 93,670 197,933 190,209 244,159 323,762 437,932 571,215 765,881
Collection Period - 17 34 17 45 42 40 39 38 37
Inventories 13,591 50,610 60,954 105,130 137,255 181,795 243,405 324,205 415,967 547,959
Average Inventory Holding Period - 65 67 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Operating Current Assets 35,714 76,509 166,672 323,265 358,321 468,391 626,253 844,109 1,096,915 1,464,947
Other liabilities (2,364) (19,146) - (19,456) (19,456) (19,456) (19,456) (19,456) (19,456) (19,456)
Trade and Other Payables (84,388) (136,744) (194,158) (351,570) (411,766) (515,084) (669,364) (864,548) (1,074,581) (1,369,898)
Payable Period - 223 199 180 170 165 160 155 150
Operating Current Liabilities (86,752) (155,890) (194,158) (371,026) (431,222) (534,540) (688,820) (884,004) (1,094,037) (1,389,354)
Operating Working Capital (51,038) (79,381) (27,486) (47,761) (72,901) (66,150) (62,566) (39,895) 2,879 75,593
Net PP&E 15,795 26,696 37,528 62,309 96,614 152,097 226,626 287,495 338,266 397,596
Intangible Assets (w/o Goodwill) 17,440 35,592 67,302 1,467,396 1,252,841 1,081,913 1,005,641 1,027,961 1,142,615 1,367,436
Goodwill 25,503 38,449 36,043 219,543 307,360 399,568 479,482 565,789 656,315 748,199
Growth 51% -6% 40% 30% 20% 18% 16% 14%
Other long term assets (13,984) (1,072) (18,346) (30,637) (46,794) (64,356) (89,605) (124,311) (166,412) (229,154)
% of revenues -6% 0% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3%
Core Invested Capital (6,284) 20,284 95,041 1,670,850 1,537,121 1,503,072 1,559,578 1,717,039 1,973,662 2,359,669
Investment in Associates 23 58 86 2,454 3,632 5,375 7,955 11,774 17,425 25,267
Growth 152% 48% 2753% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 45%
Investments - 278 566 15,289 21,405 27,826 35,617 44,878 55,648 67,891
Growth 104% 2601% 40% 30% 28% 26% 24% 22%
Non-core Invested Capital 23 336 652 17,743 25,037 33,201 43,573 56,652 73,074 93,158
Invested Capital (6,261) 20,620 95,693 1,688,593 1,562,157 1,536,274 1,603,150 1,773,691 2,046,736 2,452,827
Total funds invested: Sources
Interest bearing loan and borrowings 20,013 - - - - - - - -  - 
Lease Liabilites - 66,133 103,034 107,616 112,997 119,777 126,964 134,581 144,002 154,082
Growth Rate 56% 4% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7%
Debt and debt equivalents 20,013 - - 107,616 112,997 119,777 126,964 134,581 144,002 154,082
Equity and equity equivalents 118,916 396,903 1,128,431 1,924,276 1,997,877 2,019,461 1,984,578 1,919,212 1,910,853 2,106,311
Excess of Cash (145,190) (376,283) (1,032,738) (343,299) (548,717) (602,964) (508,392) (280,103) (8,119) 192,434
Invested Capital (6,261) 20,620 95,693 1,688,593 1,562,157 1,536,274 1,603,150 1,773,691 2,046,736 2,452,827
Transactions with Shareholders 371,360 896,246 1,036,059 672,909 620,469 472,550 330,312 63,385 (266,368)
Payout Ratio -471% -500% -400% -110% -100% -90% -80% -70% -60%
Reformulated cash flow statement Forecasted Cash Flow Statement  
(in $ thousands) FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Core Business
(NOLLAT) / NOPLAT (88,637) (94,363) (173,366) (269,552) (620,054) (632,038) (550,377) (446,191) (127,690) 401,252
Depreciation and Amortization 6,897 10,980 23,537 23,543 306,831 291,534 245,525 214,994 205,666 208,407
Gross Cash Flow (81,740) (83,383) (149,829) (246,009) (313,223) (340,504) (304,852) (231,197) 77,976 609,659
Net working capital (NWC) (51,038) (79,381) (27,486) (47,761) (72,901) (66,150) (62,566) (39,895) 2,879 75,593
Change in NWC 28,343 (51,894) 20,275 25,140 (6,752) (3,583) (22,672) (42,774) (72,714)
Others 11,519 37,377 17,697 188,906 260,567 335,212 389,877 441,478 489,903 519,045
Change in Others (25,858) 19,680 (171,209) (71,660) (74,645) (54,665) (51,601) (48,425) (29,142)
Capital Expenditures in Net PP&E (14,549) (18,170) (34,272) (49,441) (69,995) (96,066) (93,253) (96,756) (114,793)
% of Revenues -4% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -2% -2% -2%
Capital Expenditures in Intangible Assets (w/o Goodwill) (25,484) (47,909) (1,414,146) (77,140) (106,093) (147,716) (204,930) (274,334) (377,766)
% of Revenues -7% -8% -140% -5% -5% -5% -5% -5% -5%
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) (40,033) (66,079) (1,448,418) (126,582) (176,088) (243,782) (298,183) (371,090) (492,558)
Gross Investment (37,548) (98,293) (1,599,353) (173,101) (257,485) (302,030) (372,455) (462,289) (594,414)
Free Cash Flow (120,931) (248,123) (1,845,361) (486,325) (597,989) (606,882) (603,652) (384,313) 15,245
Non-Core Business
Non Core Result (73) 233 3,093 7,130 13,150 21,040 29,456 38,755 48,443 58,132
Invested Capital in Non-core Business 23 336 652 17,743 25,037 33,201 43,573 56,652 73,074 93,158
Investment Cash Flow (313) (316) (17,091) (7,294) (8,165) (10,371) (13,079) (16,422) (20,084)
Non-Operating Cash Flow (80) 2,777 (9,961) 5,857 12,876 19,085 25,676 32,021 38,048
Cash Flow available to Investors (121,011) (245,346) (1,855,323) (480,468) (585,114) (587,797) (577,977) (352,292) 53,293
Other Comprehensive Income (19,679) 14,602 (14,563) (18,857) (12,428) (21,583) (17,623) (17,212) (18,806) (17,880)
Financing
Financial Result (392) 757 5,556 22,208 7,597 12,112 13,488 11,758 7,502 2,442
Net Financial Assets (125,177) (376,283) (1,032,738) (235,682) (435,720) (483,187) (381,428) (145,521) 135,883 346,516
Investment in Net Financial Assets (251,106) (656,456) 797,056 (200,038) (47,467) 101,759 235,907 281,404 210,633
Equity 118,916 396,903 1,128,431 1,924,276 1,997,877 2,019,461 1,984,578 1,919,212 1,910,853 2,106,311
Total Comprehensive Result (108,781) (78,771) (179,281) (259,072) (611,736) (620,469) (525,056) (412,890) (90,551) 443,946
Net Cash Transaction with Shareholders 356,758 910,809 1,054,917 685,337 642,052 490,173 347,523 82,191 (248,487)
Financing Free Cash-Flow (106,409) (259,909) (1,874,180) (492,896) (606,697) (605,420) (595,188) (371,098) 35,413
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Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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The present individual report serves the purpose of analyzing the importance of the take-rate 
on the online marketplaces as well as evaluating its impact on the 
company’s financials. 
This analysis was then focused on Farfetch, the leading technology platform for the global 
luxury fashion, through a comparison between the company and its 
competitors and other online marketplaces. 
After evaluating the differences and similarities, we performed a sensitivity analysis to measure 
the take-rate oscillations impact on the company’s revenue and share-
price. It was then possible to conclude that Farfetch is highly sensitive to 
changes in the take-rate and that the company should manage its 
partnerships mix to include more new designers and small boutiques so it 
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Luxury fashion market is shifting to online and so it became crucial for traditional luxury brands 
to update its business model (D'Arpizio, 2018), whether through investing resources into their 
own online platforms or selling through online luxury marketplaces, such as Farfetch. 
Nowadays, luxury retail represents the delivery of value for both customers and sellers and 
specially it represents the understanding of who the target is – Millennials.  
In recent years, online retailers allowed sellers (brands, manufacturers or designers) to use their 
platforms as a channel to reach customers in exchange for a commission (take-rate), disrupting 
the traditional reselling format (Abhishek, 2016). However, sellers are still the ones who decide 
about the products’ prices, contrarily to the buy and sell format. 
Kotler (2010) believes that companies use third-party providers to increase the penetration 
probability of the products in the market at a lower cost and because companies are then able 
to focus on the core activities instead of worrying about the logistics. In the luxury market, for 
new designers or small boutiques, third-party partners can be helpful to reach the global market 
and for marketing purposes.  
As it was previously said, retailers’ revenue derives from the type of service they provide – 
whether they can have their own inventory and sell directly to the final consumer acting as 
principal, or they can act like an intermediary and connect the seller with the client winning a 
commission. There is when the take-rate concept emerges. 
The take-rate (or rake) refers to the percentage of the transactions that each marketplace 
facilitates between sellers and customers that they keep as revenue. It is considered as a 




How do Retailers define their prices? 
The take-rate indicates how the company is positioned in the market and consecutively the 
company’s negotiation power.  
In the retail industry, it is possible to find a wide range of commission rates, from 0% to 85% 
(Chen, 2018), so the question is why are some markeplaces able to charge more than others? In 
order to define the take-rates, companies have to demonstrate its proposition value and if 
possible some exclusivity (and consequently reach higher rakes) that is crucial to be the best 
alternative in the market meaning, retailers have to consider that what sellers are willing to pay 
depends on how good or bad the alternative is.  
With this, there are two key matters for pricing definition: 
▪ Fragmented Category 
▪ Managed Marketplaces 
Fragmented Category 
Fragmented Category helps evaluating how easy it is to find an alternative, depending on the 
business. When we refer to a marketplace which collects products from various sellers, 
consumers’ alternative would be sorting a hundred of options from different sources. As an 
example, online travel agencies imposed a take-rate for flight booking of approximately 3% 
when compared to hotels that is almost 15%. The reason behind this fact is that as a customer, 
it is easier to search for 3 or 5 airline websites and book a flight. However, considering that the 
hotels landscape is so fragmented,  it would be simpler to work with an agency that would 
aggregate all the possibilities than going through each individually (Chen, 2018).  
The same happens with the luxury fashion marketplaces which are highly fragmented due to a 
large number of brands, and to the various categories such as clothes, shoes, accessories, and 




The Managed Marketplace factor is related to the value added to the marketplace – beyond 
connecting buyers and sellers. For example, in luxury fashion, online platforms apart from 
acting as an intermediary can add value by creating content - styling, photographing, photo-
editing and content management.  
What is happening with Farfetch?  
Farfetch is currently exercising its pricing power. The company’s take-rate varied between 30% 
in 2015 to 32% in 2018, charging lower rakes to brands than to boutiques - boutiques generally 
are less exposed to the market and need Farfetch to empower their online presence. 
Along with the primary application (the marketplace), Farfetch offers three other applications 
and various types of services such as content creation, inventory management, fulfilment, 
customer service– which led to conclude that is a managed marketplace. The company also 
entered into a partnership with Prada to become its permanent retail partner for Linea Rossa 
collection, and it offers more than 500 designer exclusives on its marketplace. When compared 
to its closest competitors (luxury online retailers), Farfetch has the highest take-rate (table 1). 
The reason behind this fact is that more than a typical retailer, Farfetch is a technological 
company which aims to provide its sellers the best service, from the basic services such as 
fulfilment to the most complex ones such as data insights, luxury market trends, and others. 
Table 1 - Farfetch vs Competitors 
Company Take-Rate Exclusives Designs 
YNAP 7.0% 1,131 
MyTheresa 8.0% 686 
Matches Fashion - 1,350 
24 sèvres 14.0% 124 
Farfetch 32.0% 500+ 
Source: Each company website and External sources 
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After comparing Farfetch’s rake with some of the most successful marketplaces it was possible 
to conclude that the company’s commission rate is one of the highest in the online retail market 
and that most of the high take-rates are associated with managed platforms as it can be seen in 
graph 1. 
 
Source: (Chen 2018) 
Graph 1 - Successful marketplaces and Farfetch's competitors take rate 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand if Farfetch is going to be able to maintain its take-rate 
and which are the take-rate oscillations impact on the company’s revenue and share price. 
Is it good to have high take-rates? 
Gurley (2013) stated that even though it may be logical to assume that high take-rates are always 
better, in some cases the opposite may be often true. What can happen when online 
marketplaces charge high rakes is that the products’ price will probably jump becoming part of 
the consumers’ stake. It can also influence sellers to look for cheaper alternatives. Therefore, if 
in the future Farfetch’s take-rate continues increasing, it may turn unsustainable for the small 
boutiques/new designers, which aim to boost their online presence at a low cost, to continue 
working with Farfetch. However, decreasing the commission to its competitors’ level may 
compromise the company’s operation. 
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So, will Farfetch be able to maintain its rake?  
Although Farfetch delivers high-value proposition to its consumers offering services beyond 
aggregating supply and demand, the online luxury industry is becoming increasingly 
competitive and competition can impact on how online marketplaces optimize take-rates 
(Caplinger, 2017).  So on one hand, having high take-rates is good if in the future the company 
is able to maintain it whether through its exclusivity or services provided to sellers. On the other 
hand, it can give a negative effect if sellers start selling on other platforms with lower rakes – 
specially those new designers and small boutiques. Therefore, to evaluate the impact of both 
situations in the company’s revenue and share price, we created two scenarios: the first one 
where the take-rate would converge to the average of the sixth most successful marketplaces 
(49.70% in 2025), and the second one where the take-rate would fall to the average of its 
competitors (9.70% in 2025). As it is possible to observe in Table 2, if in 2025 Farfetch’s take- 
rate equals the average of its competitors (previously identified), its share price will be equal to 
-$11.14. However, if its rake converges to the second scenario (49.70%), the company’s share 
price will jump to $93.78 compared with our expectation of $16.98. With this, it is possible to 
conclude that Farfetch is highly sensitive to changes in the take-rate. Therefore, the company 
must be able to maintain or increase it to be sustainable in the future. 
Table 2 - Sensitivity Analysis 
As of 2025E  Downward  Forecasted  Upward 
Take-Rate  9.70%  29.30%  49.70% 
Revenue (in thousand)  $4,243,920  $7,555,314  $11,001,866 
Total Comprehensive Result (in thousand)  $187,003  $443,946  $701,909 
Share Price  -$11.14  $16.98  $93.78 
 
Knowing that the company charges higher rakes to boutiques and new designers than to well 
known consolidated brands, Farfetch should manage its partnerships mix in order to continue 
attracting boutiques and brand new designers to its marketplace. 
